Product 05 / Optional GNSS denial software module
Adds optional software-controlled GNSS denial to the ADS engagement chain, enabling cue-based disruption or misleading of hostile UAS navigation following detection and coordination through the command-and-control system.
Multi-channel
GNSS module
Cue-based
Employment mode
C2-integrated
Engagement chain
Receive detection cue
Coordinate through C2
Apply GNSS denial
| Function | GNSS spoofing of hostile UAS navigation |
|---|---|
| Integration | Interfaced with the detection subsystem and C2 chain |
| Employment mode | Cue-based engagement following detection |
| Availability | Optional module in software |
Imagery
Field record
Representative deployment scenarios for this subsystem. Site names are withheld; configurations reflect delivered and trialled arrangements.
A pre-programmed platform flying a waypoint mission carried no active control link, leaving RF jamming with no signal to act against.
GNSS denial was cued from the detection chain, degrading the navigation solution and forcing the platform into fail-safe behaviour short of the protected area.
No link
Threat profile
Cue-based
Activation
Fail-safe
Observed effect
An evaluation authority needed measurable evidence of navigation misdirection under controlled conditions rather than blunt denial.
Spoofed constellations shifted the reported position of the trial platform along a planned vector, logged through the C2 system for post-trial analysis.
Multiple
Channels engaged
Planned
Displacement vector
Logged
C2 evidence trail
